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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper identifies the effect of health insurance on workers’ compensation (WC) filing 
for young adults by implementing a regression discontinuity design using WC medical claims 
data from Texas. The results suggest health insurance factors into the decision to have WC pay 
for discretionary care. The implied instrumental variables estimates suggest a 10 percentage 
point decrease in health insurance coverage increases WC bills by 15.3 percent. Despite the large 
impact of health insurance on the number of WC bills, the additional cost to WC at age 26 
appears to be small as most of the increase comes from small bills. 
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Workers’ compensation (WC) is a state-regulated insurance program that provides partial 
wage replacement and pays medical bills for employees injured on the job. Workers benefit from 
having WC pay for treatment because they have no copays or deductibles for care, but firms 
have an incentive to decrease WC claims because treating an injury is typically more expensive 
under WC than health insurance (Baker and Krueger 1995; Johnson, Baldwin, and Burton 1996; 
Leigh and Ward 1997) and because WC benefits can encourage workers to delay returning to 
work. Ex-post moral hazard arises with the filing decision because injured workers choose 
whether or not to file for WC (Butler and Worrall 1991). By making medical care apart from WC 
cheaper, health insurance has the potential to influence the worker’s filing decision. Studying the 
effect of health insurance on WC claiming is difficult because health insurance is not randomly 
assigned to workers or to firms, which means examining the correlation between health 
insurance and WC filing is not informative about the effect of health insurance on WC filing. 
In this paper, I study the health insurance cutoff created by the Affordable Care Act’s 
(ACA) expansion of dependent coverage until the age of 26 to estimate the causal effect of 
health insurance on WC filing for young adults. Under the ACA, firms that offer dependent 
coverage have to allow employees’ children to stay on their health insurance until the age of 26. 
Young adults on either side of their twenty-sixth birthdays are very similar except that people 
just shy of their twenty-sixth birthdays can be on their parents’ health insurance while people 
who just turned 26 cannot. I use Texas WC administrative data and this abrupt decrease in 
private health insurance coverage to implement a regression discontinuity design by comparing 
people on either side of their twenty-sixth birthdays. As long as other factors that affect WC 
filing do not change abruptly at age 26, this strategy provides estimates of the causal effect of 
health insurance coverage on WC filing for young adults. 
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In principle, there should be no relationship between having health insurance and filing 
for WC. If an injury occurs at work, WC should pay for medical treatment. If an injury occurs 
outside of work, health insurance or the individual should pay for treatment. However, as Card 
and McCall (1996) explain, workers without health insurance have an incentive to claim their 
medical issues are work-related even if they are not so that WC will pay for care. If the injury 
occurs at work, health insurance may deter workers from filing for WC if they feel there is a 
cost to filing a WC claim. As Lakdawalla, Reville, and Seabury (2007) explain, filing a WC 
claim is costly if employers dissuade people from filing WC because they fear the claims will 
increase their premiums. Injured workers also might not want to deal with the paperwork from 
WC or fear that they will be called on to prove that their injury was caused by work. Some workers 
may feel there is a stigma associated with filing for WC. Similarly, providers may encourage 
workers to have health insurance pay for their care since billing WC may have additional 
administrative burdens (Leigh and Ward 1997). Because manipulating the payment source is more 
difficult for visible injuries and emergencies, health insurance would be most likely to affect 
medical care that can easily be delayed. 
Biddle and Roberts (2003) study benefit claiming among eligible workers by surveying 
Michigan workers identified by physicians as likely having work-related injuries. They find that 
70 percent of injured workers did not file for WC and that 36 percent of the nonreporting injured 
workers cited having health insurance as a reason they did not file. Lakdawalla, Reville, and 
Seabury (2007) use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and find that 
workers at firms that offer health insurance are 16 percentage points more likely to file for WC 
than workers at firms that do not offer health insurance. Lakdawalla, Reville, and Seabury 
hypothesize that large firms may be more likely to provide workers with information about WC 
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and to encourage them to use it. Heaton (2012) studies the impact of the Massachusetts health 
insurance reform on WC and finds health care reform results in WC paying for fewer emergency 
room medical bills. Card and McCall (1996) and Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) both study how 
health insurance factors into the increased number of Monday claims for easy-to-conceal 
injuries. They both find no difference in Monday claiming by health insurance status, which 
suggests the Monday effect is not driven by people claiming nonwork injuries from the weekend 
are work related so that WC would pay the medical costs. 
In this paper, I use the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to study how health insurance and employment change 
at age 26. The estimates for the fall in insurance coverage for working adults range from 4.4 to 
5.3 percentage points. I find no evidence of abrupt employment increases at age 26. To study 
how health insurance affects WC filing, I use Texas WC administrative data that contain 
information on all medical bills associated with each WC claim. I find that total WC medical 
bills increase immediately after young adults turn 26, as do claims for injuries that plausibly do 
not require immediate medical care. The mean number of bills per claim trends smoothly at age 
26, which suggests that claims are not becoming more severe at age 26. Instead, the increase in 
bills appears to come from claims that began before workers turned 26. These results suggest 
discretionary care is most responsive to health insurance. The implied instrumental variables 
(IV) estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point decrease in health insurance coverage results in 
an increase in WC bills of 15.3 percent. Despite the large impact of health insurance on WC 
bills, the additional costs to WC at age 26 are small because the increase in total bills comes 
from small bills. These results imply that the expansion of health insurance from the ACA will 
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shift many medical bills to being paid for by health insurance instead of WC but that the size of 
the cost shifting will be small. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next sections discuss background on WC 
and dependent coverage and consider health insurance and labor force changes occurring at age 
26. The paper then describes the Texas WC data and considers how claims, total care received, 
the intensity of claims, and the cost of care change at age 26. The final section provides a 
discussion of the results and concludes. 
BACKGROUND 
Workers’ Compensation 
WC insurance pays medical bills and replaces lost wages for employees who are injured 
during the course of employment. In exchange for being able to receive WC benefits, workers 
cannot sue their employers for negligence. Thus, WC insurance also protects firms from lawsuits 
by injured employees. WC insurance is regulated at the state level, and benefits to injured 
workers are set by the state. Although some states restrict injured workers’ choice of physician, a 
majority of states—including Texas—allow injured workers to choose their own medical 
providers. While WC pays for medical care immediately after an injury occurs, injured workers 
become eligible for income replacement benefits after missing three to seven days of work, 
dependent on the state. In Texas, injured workers become eligible for income replacement 
benefits after missing at least seven days of work. The injured workers’ weekly cash benefits are 
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a function of their weekly earnings subject to a maximum that varies across states.1  For 
thorough overviews of WC, refer to Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno (2013) and Utterback, 
Meyers, and Wurzelbacher (2014). 
In their summary of WC spending, Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno (2013) note that $30 
billion was paid to cover injured workers’ medical expenses through WC in 2011. They also note 
that the majority of WC cases—around 76 percent—are medical-only cases and do not involve 
payments for missed work. Although $30 billion is small compared to 2011’s total medical 
spending of $2.7 trillion, the amount makes up a large percentage of WC costs. According to 
Sengupta et al., the share of medical benefits as a percentage of the total amount paid to workers 
has risen from around 30 percent in the early 1990s to approximately 50 percent in 2011. As 
many people with work-related injuries do not file for WC, the medical cost of work injuries is 
higher than total WC medical costs. Leigh (2011) estimates that the true medical cost of work-
related injuries in 2007 was $60 billion and that the total cost of work-related injuries in 2007 
was $250 billion, which was more than the cost of cancer, coronary heart disease, and stroke. 
Texas differs from all states other than Oklahoma in that Texas employers are not 
required to purchase WC insurance. Despite this, 81 percent of Texas workers work for firms 
with WC insurance as of 2012 (Texas Department of Insurance [TDI] 2012). Relatively few 
studies have examined firms’ decisions to opt out of WC in Texas (Morantz 2010). Two 
exceptions are Butler (1996) and Morantz (2010). Butler studies differences in injury rates 
between subscribing and nonsubscribing firms and finds that both types of firms have similar 
fatality rates. He finds that nonsubscribing firms have slightly higher nonfatal injury rates, likely 
1 Previous research has studied how claiming behavior responds to a variety of incentives, such as benefit 
levels and antifraud measures.  For examples, refer to Boden and Ruser (2003); Bronchetti and McInerney (2012); 
Guo and Burton (2010); Hansen (2014); Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995); and Neuhauser and Raphael (2004). 
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because nonsubscribers tend to offer occupational injury plans that provide first-day wage-
replacement benefits. Butler concludes that safety levels are likely similar between subscribing 
and nonsubscribing firms. Morantz surveys large firms who opt out of WC. She finds that most 
opt out to try to save money, and that nearly all nonsubscribing firms with more than 500 
employees offer health insurance to employees, which is true of large firms in general (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2013). In the last section of the paper, I discuss how the results might 
generalize to states with compulsory WC. 
Other than not being compulsory, Texas WC is generally similar to other states’ WC 
programs along most dimensions (Morantz 2010). Employers in Texas may self-insure or 
purchase insurance from an insurance company. The WC insurer pays medical providers a fixed 
amount for services performed and must report all WC medical spending to TDI, which compiles 
the information into the data set used in this paper. 
WC claims increase costs for employers in several ways. First, a WC claim may include 
lost wages, while an injury paid for by health insurance will not. Second, medical treatment costs 
for the same injury are higher under WC than traditional health care (Baker and Krueger 1995; 
Johnson, Baldwin, and Burton 1996; Leigh and Ward 1997). Third, experience rating is more 
sensitive to large claims under WC than under group health insurance (Lakdawalla, Reville, and 
Seabury 2007). Fourth, with health insurance, the injured person is responsible for copays, 
deductibles, and coinsurance, while WC pays for all of the medical care for a person injured at 
work. Finally, as is the case with dependent coverage, health insurance may come from outside 
the employer’s plan and thus may not increase the firm’s costs at all. For these reasons, 
employers may dissuade employees from filing for WC. 
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Affordable Care Act and Dependent Coverage for Young Adults 
As of September 23, 2010, the ACA mandated that employers had to allow young adults 
to stay on their parents’ health insurance until the age of 26 beginning with the next renewal date 
of their plans. Research has found that extending dependent coverage was successful in raising 
coverage for young adults (Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013; O’Hara and Brault 2013). Overall, 
for people aged 19–25, the likelihood of having employer-sponsored health insurance as a 
dependent rose by 7 percentage points, while the likelihood of having any health insurance rose 
by about 3 percentage points. Sommers et al. (2013) find that less-healthy young adults were 
more likely to sign up for dependent coverage, which has led to increases in the usage of health 
services for young adults. 
Many states, including Texas, extended dependent coverage in the decade before the 
ACA went into effect. As of 2005, non-self-insured employers in Texas were required to provide 
coverage to employees’ children until the age of 26. Research has found that the effects of states 
extending dependent coverage on overall health insurance were small compared to the effects of 
the ACA, that many of the people taking advantage of extended dependent coverage were 
students, and that it took several years before these laws had effects on coverage (Dillender 
2014; Levine, McKnight, and Heep 2011; Monheit et al. 2011). The ACA in contrast had 
immediate and large effects. The differences are likely because the ACA was well-publicized 
and people knew they could get back on their parents’ health insurance even after they had left. 
Also, the ACA requires self-insured employers to comply and extends coverage to married 
young adults, which the state-level laws do not. Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2013) find no 
evidence of differential effects of the ACA’s dependent coverage mandate between states with 
and without prior dependent coverage. As most states passed their dependent coverage laws in 
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the few years before the ACA, finding no differential effect of the ACA based on prior 
dependent coverage laws is consistent with no early effects of state-level dependent coverage. 
The main results use WC data from 2011 to 2013. Even though Texas had a prior 
dependent coverage law, the estimates are still valid since they are from a regression 
discontinuity design and do not identify the effect of dependent coverage using variation over 
time. As a placebo test, I also compute estimates using data from 2005 to 2007. As state-level 
dependent coverage laws generally rose by 7 percentage points, while the likelihood of having 
any health insurance rose by about 3 percentage points. Sommers et al. (2013) find that less-
healthy young adults were more likely to sign up for dependent coverage, which has led to 
increases in the usage of health services for young adults. 
Many states, including Texas, extended dependent coverage in the decade before the 
ACA went into effect. As of 2005, non-self-insured employers in Texas were required to provide 
coverage to employees’ children until the age of 26. Research has found that the effects of states 
extending dependent coverage on overall health insurance were small compared to the effects of 
the ACA, that many of the people taking advantage of extended dependent coverage were 
students, and that it took several years before these laws had effects on coverage (Dillender 
2014; Levine, McKnight, and Heep 2011; Monheit et al. 2011). The ACA in contrast had 
immediate and large effects. The differences are likely because the ACA was well-publicized 
and people knew they could get back on their parents’ health insurance even after they had left. 
Also, the ACA requires self-insured employers to comply and extends coverage to married 
young adults, which the state-level laws do not. Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2013) find no 
evidence of differential effects of the ACA’s dependent coverage mandate between states with 
and without prior dependent coverage. As most states passed their dependent coverage laws in 
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the few years before the ACA, finding no differential effect of the ACA based on prior 
dependent coverage laws is consistent with no early effects of state-level dependent coverage. 
The main results use WC data from 2011 to 2013. Even though Texas had a prior 
dependent coverage law, the estimates are still valid since they are from a regression 
discontinuity design and do not identify the effect of dependent coverage using variation over 
time. As a placebo test, I also compute estimates using data from 2005 to 2007. As state-level 
dependent coverage laws generally had smaller and delayed effects, we would expect little or no 
discontinuities at age 26 during these years. 2 
CHANGES IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND EMPLOYMENT AT AGE 26 
Although research has found that the ACA’s dependent coverage provision has increased 
health insurance coverage for young adults, less is known about the transition from dependent 
coverage at the age of 26.  I begin by examining what happens to health insurance coverage after 
people are no longer eligible for insurance through their parents’ employers.  Since the WC 
administrative data do not have health insurance status, I use data from the 2011 and 2012 NHIS 
and the 2008 SIPP.  The advantage of the NHIS data is that they allow for implementing the 
same basic strategy as I implement with the WC administrative data.  An issue with the NHIS 
data is that they do not contain state-identifiers.  A possible concern is that the discontinuity 
would be different in Texas because the state had a prior dependent coverage law or because 
insurance coverage is lower there than the rest of the nation.  To examine Texas specifically, I 
2 Prior to the ACA, there was no set age at which young adults would be removed from their parents’ health 
insurance plans in states that had not formally defined dependent coverage.  Many private health insurance contracts 
covered young adults until the age of 23 if they were in college and until age 19 otherwise.  Anderson et al. (2012, 
2014) study these discontinuities and find that young adults losing health insurance reduces their usage of health 
care services. 
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estimate fixed effects models using the 2008 SIPP to estimate the effect of turning 26 on health 
insurance coverage and labor force participation. 
Regression Discontinuity Strategy with NHIS Data 
The NHIS is a survey of a stratified random sample of the U.S. population that asks 
respondents detailed questions about health, health insurance, and health care access. I focus on 
insurance through an employer, insurance through the individual market, and overall coverage. I 
use the individual’s birth month and the month of the interview to create the individual’s age in 
months at the time of the interview, which allows for implementing a regression discontinuity 
design. 
In addition to asking about health insurance coverage, the NHIS asks various questions 
about employment. The need for health insurance has been shown to induce people to enter the 
labor force.3  Using a difference-in-differences strategy, Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2013) find 
the ACA’s dependent provision has decreased the percentage of eligible individuals in the labor 
force. Young adults beginning work immediately upon their twenty-sixth birthdays would 
generate an increase in WC claims even if health insurance has no effect on filing. I use the 
employment variables to test for various labor force discontinuities at age 26 to evaluate 
concerns about immediate labor force participation changes at 26 hindering the WC 
identification strategy. 
I restrict the sample to include people aged 24–27.  Means of key variables are shown in 
Table 1.  About two-thirds of the sample has health insurance.  Of those with health insurance, 
3 For examples, refer to Buchmueller and Carpenter (2012); Dague, DeLeire, and Leninger (2014); 
Dillender (2015); and Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigo (2014).  While research generally finds access to health 
insurance influences labor force participation, Baicker et al. (2013) find no evidence that the Oregon Medicaid 
lottery influenced labor market outcomes. 
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75 percent have it through an employer.  Figure 1 shows the age profiles for various outcomes of 
interest.  The age profiles of the health insurance variables are relatively flat until age 26, at 
which point individuals experience a decrease in employer-sponsored health insurance and an 
increase in the likelihood of being uninsured.  None of the age profiles for the employment 
variables reveal a trend break at age 26.  To quantify the discontinuities and to test their 
statistical significance, I estimate the following equation: 
(1) yi = γt + Xiα + f (mi) + Post26iβ + ηi, 
where i indexes the individual; t indexes the year; y represents the various outcomes of interest; 
X is a set of individual covariates that includes sex, race, education, and marital status; γ is an 
indicator variable for the year 2011; f (m) is a smooth function representing the age profile for 
the dependent variable with respect to age in months m; Post26 is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the individual is at least 26; and η is an unobserved error component. I estimate Equation (1) 
by modeling f (m) as a quadratic on either side of the threshold. The coefficient on Post26 can be 
interpreted as the percentage-point change in the outcome variable at 26. 
The estimates of the percentage-point discontinuities at age 26 from Equation (1) with 
health insurance–dependent variables are shown in Panel A of Table 2. Standard errors are 
clustered by age and shown in parentheses below the estimates. At the age of 26, young adults 
experience a decrease in having employer-sponsored health insurance of 8.6 percentage points, 
which represents a nearly 15 percent reduction in employer-sponsored coverage. Privately 
purchased health insurance may increase, but the coefficient is not statistically distinguishable 
from zero. Young adults experience an increase in the likelihood of being uninsured of 4.2 
percentage points or 14 percent. 
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Panel A of Table 2 also displays estimates of the above-age-26 coefficients from 
Equation (1) with employment dependent variables. Although I cannot rule out large 
employment discontinuities, all of the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero for 
both the intensive and extensive margins. The smoothness at age 26 is likely due in part to the 
fact that finding a job is not an instant process. Ilg and Theodossiou (2012) find that the average 
job search for an unemployed worker lasts over two months and that more than a quarter of 
unemployed workers search for more than six months. Young adults decreasing labor force 
participation to attend school or to search longer for a better job would not create a sharp 
discontinuity at age 26. Thus, even though dependent coverage affects labor force participation, 
the ACA’s dependent coverage provision does not appear to create a discontinuous increase in 
the likelihood of working.4   
Panel B of Table 2 displays estimates of the above-age-26 coefficients with health 
insurance variables as the dependent variables with the sample restricted to working young 
adults. The estimates are generally similar to the estimates for the full sample. 
Fixed Effects Strategy with SIPP Data 
The SIPP is a longitudinal survey of the civilian noninstitutionalized population. In 
addition to containing state-level identifiers, the SIPP also follows individuals over time, which 
allows for estimating fixed effect models. Another advantage of the SIPP is that it asks about the 
source of employer-sponsored coverage, meaning I know if people have insurance through their 
own employers or as dependents. I use data from January 2011 to August 2013 and broaden the 
4 Labor force variables trending smoothly around health insurance cutoffs is consistent with previous 
research.  For example, Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2008, 2009) find the age profile for employment is smooth at 
age 65.  This is in spite of the fact that research typically finds the availability of health insurance influences 
retirement decisions (Gruber and Madrian 2002).  Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross (2012) provide an example of 
employment trending smoothly at a health insurance cutoff for young adults. 
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age window to include young adults aged 23–28. Unfortunately, even with the broadened age 
ranges, the sample only contains 820 Texans, only 159 of whom turn 26 after 2010. The small 
sample size makes the estimates for Texas noisy.5 
Descriptive statistics for young adults in Texas and the rest of the nation are shown in 
Table 3. Compared to the rest of the U.S., Texas has a higher uninsured rate and a lower 
percentage of people with college degrees for these age groups. With the SIPP data, I estimate 
the following equation: 
(2) yit = γt + Xitα + Post26itβ + νi + uit, 
where ν is an individual fixed effect, γ is a full vector of indicator variables for the month and 
year of the interview, X now includes an indicator for being married and a linear control for age, 
and u is the unobserved error component. The coefficient on P ost26 is now identified by how 
outcomes change for individuals after they turn 26. 
Panel A of Table 4 displays estimates of the changes in health insurance coverage at age 
26 from Equation (2). The estimate for the loss in employer-sponsored health insurance as a 
dependent at age 26 in Texas is −0.082, while the coefficient for the rest of the U.S. is −0.046. 
The decrease in insurance as a dependent is not offset by an increase in insurance through one’s 
own employer. The estimates for the decrease in employer-sponsored coverage in Texas of 
−0.075 is similar to the NHIS estimate of −0.086, while the estimate for the rest of the nation is 
smaller at −0.043. The estimate for the increase in being uninsured at 26 is 0.031 in Texas. 
Although it is insignificant, I cannot reject that it or the national estimate of 0.050 is different 
than the NHIS estimate of 0.042. 
5 The SIPP interviews people every four months and asks about each month since the previous interview.  
Chetty (2008) finds that people report the same responses during one interview for all four months associated with 
the interview period.  Therefore, I follow Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) and restrict the data to the interview month. 
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Panel A of Table 4 also displays estimates of the change in employment at age 26. For 
Texas, all of the estimates of changes in employment at age 26 are statistically insignificant. For 
the rest of the United States, the estimates suggest that people may be working less at the 
intensive margin. I find no evidence that suggests that labor force participation increases 
dramatically at age 26. Panel B of Table 4 displays estimates that restrict the sample to working 
people. When I condition the sample on being employed, the point estimate of the change in 
coverage rises slightly for Texas, while the point estimate for the rest of the United States falls 
slightly. While the estimates for Texas are noisy, I find no evidence to suggest that the changes 
in health insurance at 26 are dramatically different in Texas than in the rest of the United States. 
Because the SIPP only contains age in years, there are fewer ages in the sample, which 
makes controlling for the age profile more challenging than with the NHIS. In Appendix A, I 
consider the robustness of the SIPP results to different controls for age. The health insurance 
estimates are very similar when I control for a quadratic polynomial in age and when I do not 
control for age. The labor force participation estimates are slightly more sensitive, but I still find 
no evidence to suggest that labor force participation increases immediately at age 26 regardless 
of specification. 
CHANGES IN WC CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AT AGE 26 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
To examine the effect of losing access to insurance through a parent’s employer on WC 
claiming, I use WC administrative data from the Texas Department of Insurance’s Division of 
Workers’ Compensation. The data contain the month each claim began, the cost of each bill, the 
ICD-9 code for each bill, the birth month of each claimant, and a unique identifier for each 
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claim. Since the data contain information about the underlying claims as well as for all medical 
bills, they allow for distinguishing between claims and bills. Each injury or illness has one claim 
associated with it, while each claim generally consists of multiple bills. I create one data set with 
claims as the unit of observation and another data set with bills as the unit of observation. 
Around 60 percent of bills contain the exact date of service. Since knowing age in months is 
crucial, I only use these bills in the bill-level analysis.6  I compute the individual’s age in months 
at the time the claim began as well as at the time of each medical treatment when it is known. 
For the main analysis, I use data on WC claims that occurred from 2011 to 2013.7   
One advantage of these data is that they are likely highly accurate because they come 
directly from WC insurers. Another advantage is that TDI does not truncate or censor any of the 
bills. Although less than 5 percent of claims are disputed (TDI 2010), the data are updated each 
month and reflect the resolution of any disputed claims. 
The relationship between having health insurance and filing for WC likely differs by 
injury type. Someone who sustains a cut on his face away from work will likely have a more 
difficult time filing a WC claim for treatment than someone with a sprained wrist. Someone with 
carpal tunnel syndrome may not even know whether WC or health insurance should pay for 
treatment. In addition to showing results for all claims and bills, I also use ICD-9 codes to 
classify injuries into three broad categories: strains and sprains, injuries that are neither strains 
nor sprains (nonsprains hereafter), and occupational diseases.8  As occupational diseases, strains, 
6 Alternatively, I could use the date the bill was received, which is nonmissing for all bills, to construct an 
individual’s age at the time of the bill.  The results are qualitatively very similar whenever I use this date, albeit 
smoother around the cutoff, which is not surprising since the date the bill was received is a somewhat noisy signal 
for when the services were received. 
7 The data were obtained from TDI in December 2013, so the information is incomplete for the last few 
months of the data. 
8 Examples of nonsprain injuries include burns, lacerations, and crushing wounds.  The occupational 
disease category includes all diseases paid for by WC.  Examples include carpal tunnel syndrome and herniated disc 
15 
                                                 
and sprains generally require less immediate care, they would likely be more responsive to health 
insurance than nonsprain injuries. 
Public health research finds that health care is more difficult to access on weekends, that 
elective care comprises a much smaller share of hospital admissions on weekends, and that a 
larger share of hospital admissions come through the emergency department on weekends (Bell 
and Redelmeier 2001; Kostis et al. 2007; Ryan, Levit, and Davis 2010). For these reasons, 
injuries and conditions that are more often treated on weekends are plausibly more likely to be 
emergencies with treatment that is more difficult to delay than those that are treated during the 
week. As such, I compute the likelihood that each ICD-9 code is first treated on the weekend and 
then separate claims into quartiles based on this measure.9  Injuries least likely to happen on the 
weekend increasing more at age 26 would suggest discretionary care is more responsive to health 
insurance. 
This strategy is similar in spirit to Dobkin (2003) and Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) 
who study emergency room admissions in California.  Both studies classify ICD-9 codes by the 
likelihood that admissions occur on weekends and consider ICD-9 codes that have similar 
admission rates on weekends and weekdays as emergencies. I classify ICD-9 codes into quartiles 
by weekend likelihood because more work is done during the week, which results in no work-
related injury ever being as likely to happen on weekends as during the week. ICD-9 codes in the 
top quartile of the weekend likelihood distribution are the closest to being evenly distributed on 
weekends and weekdays. Interpreting weekend likelihood as a measure of urgency has two 
problems.  This classification is a more aggregated version of the classifications used in Campolieti and Hyatt 
(2006) and Card and McCall (1996). 
9 I only use claims where the exact data of the first treatment is known to classify injuries.  The likelihood 
that the exact date of treatment is missing does not vary dramatically for different kinds of injuries.  Occupational 
diseases, sprains and strains, and nonsprain claims are missing the exact start date 47, 49, and 45 percent of the time. 
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important caveats. First, people in jobs that are more likely to work on weekends may be prone 
to certain types of injuries. Second, workers injured during the week might delay care until the 
weekend so they do not have to miss work. If either of these situations is the case, breaking the 
results down in this way would not yield the expected result that injuries least likely to be 
reported on weekends are most responsive to health insurance. 
Despite these possibilities, the resulting classification is generally consistent with 
treatment for injuries happening on the weekend being more difficult to delay. Strains and 
sprains, occupational diseases, and nonsprain injuries are first treated on the weekend 5.5, 5.6, 
and 9.9 percent of the time, respectively. Over 90 percent of claims in the lower half of the 
weekend distribution are occupational diseases, sprains, or strains, while over 80 percent of 
claims in the top half are nonsprain injuries. These numbers provide support for interpreting 
sprains, strains, and occupational diseases as requiring less immediate care than other injuries. 
However, within the different injury classifications, there is still variability in the likelihood that 
the ICD-9 code first receives treatment on the weekend. For instance, 14.1 percent of people with 
skull fractures first receive treatment on the weekend, while people with blisters or dislocated 
wrists are first treated on weekends less than 5 percent of the time. All of these claims fall in the 
nonsprain category. People receiving treatment for epilepsy are first treated on the weekend 15.2 
percent of the time, whereas carpal tunnel syndrome is first treated on the weekend around 1 
percent of the time. All of these claims are occupational diseases.10  Table 5 displays the top five 
injuries for each quartile and how likely they are to happen on weekends. 
10 Within the sprains and strains category, there is less variation.  Ankle injuries are most likely to receive 
care on weekends at 7.1 percent of the time, while shoulder sprains are the least likely to receive care on weekends 
at 4.9 percent of the time. 
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To implement the regression discontinuity design, I restrict the sample to include people 
within two years of their twenty-sixth birthdays. Descriptive statistics for people on either side of 
the threshold are shown in Table 6. Males account for a majority of injuries, likely because they 
work in jobs that require more manual labor. The means for charges are much larger than the 
medians, as the distribution of charges is right-skewed. 
Unlike with the NHIS, with the WC administrative data, I only observe individuals who 
claim WC. In this way, my sample differs from Biddle and Roberts (2003) and Lakdawalla, 
Reville, and Seabury (2007), who analyze WC filing decisions conditional on having been 
injured at work. Because I do not observe individuals if they do not file for WC, I use the logged 
counts of WC claims and bills as the dependent variables. Assuming the underlying populations 
at risk for WC claims trend smoothly with age, the estimates of the discontinuities can be 
interpreted as the percent changes at the age of 26.11 
Although I found no evidence of abrupt labor force participation changes at age 26 in 
Section 2, I cannot rule out large effects. As with Anderson et al. (2012) and Card et al. (2008; 
2009), I maintain the assumption of no abrupt labor force participation changes at the health 
insurance cutoff for the main results. Although a common assumption, it is a very important one. 
An abrupt increase in labor force participation would cause WC claims to increase at age 26 even 
if health insurance had no effect on WC claiming behavior. To the extent possible, I later relax 
this assumption by controlling for estimates of the number of people working in Texas from the 
American Community Survey (ACS), which is the largest data set that allows for estimating the 
size of the labor force in Texas for the time period studied. 
11 This follows Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2008), who study how hospital admissions respond to 
Medicare eligibility.  Unfortunately, using the logged counts precludes controlling for individual covariates in the 
analysis.  Although the WC data are rich in many ways, they do not have much demographic information on 
claimants that would allow for testing for heterogeneous responses. 
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To estimate the causal effect of losing access to health insurance on WC behavior, I 
estimate the following equation: 
(3) ym = f (m) + Post26iβ + ηm, 
where y is the log of the number of WC claims or medical bills occurring at age m and the other 
variables are defined as in Equation (1). As with Equation (1), I estimate Equation (3) by 
modeling f (m) as a quadratic on either side of the cutoff. In Appendix B, I verify that the results 
are robust to estimating local linear models and to using different bandwidths. In Appendix C, I 
discuss repeating the claims and bills analysis at different ages as placebo tests. 
WC Results 
WC Claims and Bills 
If losing health insurance affects the extensive margin of claiming behavior, WC claims 
should increase immediately after people turn 26. The top four graphs of Figure 2 show the 
overall number of claims and the number of claims for different types of injuries for each age. 
The overall number of claims appears to trend smoothly at age 26, though there may be a slight 
increase. Although the age profiles generally become noisier when broken down by injury type, 
it appears as though there may be an increase in strain and sprain claims at age 26, while claims 
for other injuries and for occupational diseases trend smoothly. The first column in Panel A of 
Table 7 reports the above-age-26 coefficients from estimating Equation (3) for all claims and for 
claims for different injury types using 2011 to 2013 data. All estimates are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
Although total claims do not increase dramatically at age 26, the amount of medical 
treatment paid for by WC could still respond to health insurance if young adults claim treatment 
is for a prior work-related injury even when it is not once they lose health insurance through their 
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parents’ employers at age 26. Alternatively, prior to turning 26 young adults could have health 
insurance pay for some treatment of work-related injuries if they worry about using too many 
medical services through WC or if providers encourage them to let health insurance pay for care. 
The bottom four graphs of Figure 2 display the overall number of bills and the number of 
bills for different types of injuries at each age. Total bills increase immediately at age 26, as do 
sprain and strain bills and occupational disease bills. Nonsprain bills trend smoothly at age 26. 
Column 1 in Panel B of Table 7 displays the above-age-26 coefficients from estimating Equation 
(3) for bills. The number of bills paid for by WC increases by 8.1 percent immediately after 
people turn 26. This appears to come from increases in strain and sprain bills and in the number 
of occupational disease bills, which rise by 11.4 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively. The 
estimate of the above-age-26 coefficient for bills for nonsprain injuries is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
The second column of Table 7 lists the above-age-26 coefficients from 2005 to 2007 
data. As research generally finds no effect of state-level dependent coverage laws during their 
first few years, these estimates serve as placebo tests and allow for examining the possible 
identification threat of preexisting discontinuities at age 26.12  The age profiles of these 
outcomes are shown in Appendix D. The above-age-26 coefficients for these years are all 
statistically indistinguishable from zero for bills and claims. The third column of each panel 
reports the difference between the two estimates.13  The difference between the two estimates is 
statistically significant in every instance where the 2011-2013 estimates were significant. 
12 When I estimate Equation (2) using SIPP data from 2005 to 2007, the standard errors are large but the 
point estimate for changes in health insurance coverage occurring immediately at age 26 is close to zero and 
statistically insignificant for Texas, which is consistent with previous research on these laws. 
13 To compute standard errors for the difference between the two estimates, I combine the log counts for 
2005–2007 and 2011–2013 and estimate Equation (3) supplemented with interactions of each term with an indicator 
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In column 4 of Table 7, I supplement Equation (3) with controls for employment. To do 
this, I set the dependent variable to be the log of counts of claims or bills at each age in each year 
of the WC data, meaning the regressions have 144 observations instead of 48. I use the 2011–
2013 ACS to estimate the number of Texans working at ages 24, 25, 26, and 27 in each year of 
the data and divide these estimates by 12 to obtain employment estimates for each age in months, 
which assumes that employment is evenly distributed across all ages in months.14  I also 
supplement Equation (3) with year indicator variables. If employment increases at age 26 relative 
to age 25, the above-age-26 coefficients will fall when I control for employment. The estimates 
falling dramatically after I control for employment might suggest that changes in employment 
and not WC behavior drive the results. 
The above-age-26 coefficients are reported in column 4 of Table 7 and are slightly larger 
in size but statistically indistinguishable from the original estimates for all of the estimates that 
were significant in column 1. The reason that the estimates do not fall is that more 26-year-olds 
are working in Texas than 25-year-olds in 2012 and 2013. Appendix E displays the total number 
of employed people in Texas for each age and year. These results provide more evidence that 
discontinuous increases in employment at age 26 are not responsible for the increased number of 
WC bills at age 26. 
The top four graphs of Figure 3 display counts of claims classified by the likelihood that 
the ICD-9 code is first reported on weekends. It appears that claims for injuries least likely to 
first be reported on weekends increase at age 26, while the age profiles for injuries that are more 
equal to one if the logged count is from 2011 to 2013.  The coefficient on Post26 interacted with the 2011–2013 
indicator is the difference between the two estimates presented in columns 1 and 2. 
14 Since the ACS does not have age in months, these employment estimates are imperfect.  However, if 
employment increases gradually around age 26, using the employment for each age divided by 12 will bias the 
estimates towards zero.  Employment could increase gradually for the reasons outlined in the previous section and 
would not be a threat to identification. 
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likely to occur on the weekend trend smoothly. Panel A of Table 8 displays estimates of the 
discontinuities at age 26 for claims classified by the likelihood that the ICD-9 code is first 
reported on the weekend. For injuries in the bottom quartile of the weekend likelihood 
distribution, WC claims rise by 25.7 percent, which provides evidence that the claiming behavior 
of people with deferrable injuries and illnesses is influenced by health insurance. For all other 
kinds of injuries, the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
The bottom four graphs of Figure 3 display counts of bills organized by the likelihood 
that the original injury the original injury is first reported on the weekend. As most of the injuries 
in the bottom half of the weekend distribution are sprains, strains, or occupational disease bills, 
bills for injuries in the bottom two quartiles of the weekend distribution increase discontinuously 
at age 26. Panel B of Table 8 displays estimates of bill increases with bills classified by the 
likelihood that the ICD-9 code is first reported on the weekend. The estimate for the bottom 
quartile of the weekend distribution is 0.230, while the estimate for the twenty-sixth to fiftieth 
percentile of the weekend distribution is 0.142. The estimates for the top two quartiles of the 
weekend distribution are statistically insignificant. These results suggest that follow-up care for 
open wounds or burns is more easily linked to the original injury than follow-up care for back 
strains or shoulder sprains. 
The second column in Table 8 displays equivalent estimates using data from 2005 to 
2007. As expected, I find no evidence of significant discontinuities in WC bills in the early years 
of the Texas law. As with the estimates in Table 7, the difference between the estimate from 
columns 1 and 2 is significant in every case, and the estimate in column 1 is statistically 
significant. Controlling for employment in column 4 does not dramatically alter the estimates. 
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For a more thorough study of different types of injuries, I follow Campolieti and Hyatt 
(2006) and classify injuries as back injuries, cuts and lacerations, dislocations, burns, contusions, 
or fractures based on their ICD-9 codes. Note that this classification largely excludes 
occupational diseases and sprains and strains.15  The age profiles generally trend less smoothly 
when the results are broken down into these narrower categories, so these results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Table 9 displays estimates of the above-age-26 coefficients for the specific types of 
injuries using 2011–2013 data. With claims, no category shows a statistically significant 
discontinuity at age 26. With bills, the discontinuities for back injury bills and dislocation bills 
are both positive and statistically significant at age 26. As treatment for these two types of 
injuries is likely discretionary, the results provide more evidence that the most discretionary care 
responds to health insurance. 
Type and Intensity of Treatment 
The results suggest that bills are much more sensitive to health insurance than claims. 
These patterns are consistent with WC paying for more care for workers who were injured prior 
to turning 26. An alternative story, though, is that more severe claims with more bills are 
reported immediately after people turn 26, which may cast doubt that health insurance is 
responsible for the increase since health insurance would likely affect more marginal care. I 
distinguish between these two explanations empirically by studying how the number of bills per 
claim changes at age 26. If the increase in bills comes from more severe claims being reported at 
age 26, the number of bills per claim will increase at age 26. 
15 Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) include strains and sprains as a separate category, which I did as well in 
Table 7.  Certain injuries, such as crushing injuries or damage to the eye, are excluded from both of our 
classifications.  I do not report the results for strains and sprains and occupational diseases because they are shown 
in Table 7. 
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Graph A of Figure 4 displays the mean number of bills per claim by the age of claimants 
when claims began. The graph provides no evidence to suggest that claims immediately become 
more severe at age 26. Table 10 displays the above-age-26 coefficient from Equation (3) with the 
mean number of bills per claim as the dependent variable. The estimated discontinuity is a 
statistically insignificant −0.228 from a mean of about 6.5. Graph B of Figure 4 displays the 
mean of the log of number of bills for each claim. Taking the log of the number of bills before 
calculating the means has the advantage of downweighting outliers and means that the 
discontinuity at age 26 can be interpreted as the percent change in the number of bills per claim. 
The graph again provides no evidence that claims are more severe at age 26. When the 
dependent variable is the mean of the log of the number of bills per claim, the above-age-26 
coefficient from Equation (3) is −0.035. These results are not consistent with claims becoming 
more severe at age 26 and instead suggest that WC pays for more medical care for already 
opened claims once young adults lose health insurance at age 26. 
One reason the payment source could change is that providers could prefer to be paid 
through health insurance than through WC. If the increase in bills comes from providers’ billing 
preferences, care that would be covered by both health insurance and WC would likely be more 
sensitive to health insurance coverage since these bills would allow providers to have their 
preferred payer pay for the care. I next consider how office visits, chiropractic care, and physical 
therapy change at age 26 because either WC or health insurance would pay for these treatments. 
Graph C considers how counts of WC bills for office visits trend with age, while graph D 
considers how counts of WC bills for chiropractic care and physical therapy trend with age. 
Graph E considers how counts of all other bills trend with age. Immediately at age 26, WC is 
more likely to pay for office visits, chiropractic care, and physical therapy. For other bills, the 
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increase at age 26 appears to be smaller. Table 10 displays the above-age-26 coefficients for 
these treatments. The above-age-26 coefficient is 0.081 when the log of the count of bills for 
office visits is the dependent variable and 0.180 when the log of the count of bills for physical 
therapy and chiropractic care is the dependent variable. For all other bills, the above age-age-26 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. These results provide evidence that care that would be 
covered by either WC or health insurance is most responsive to health insurance. 
WC Costs 
Next, I examine the impact of the increased number of bills at age 26 on WC costs. I use 
the current price index to compute the cost of each WC medical bill in 2013 dollars and classify 
bills into quartiles by cost. I focus on the 2011–2013 estimates as I did not find evidence of bill 
increases for 2005–2007. A bill is in the top quartile if it is greater than $568 and in the bottom 
quartile if it is less than $127. Graphs A–D of Figure 5 display counts of bills by cost quartile 
and reveal discontinuities for the bottom three quartiles of bill costs. The above-age-26 
coefficients from Equation (3) are shown in Panel A of Table 11 and range from 8.6 to 12.4 
percent for bills in the bottom three quartiles. The number of bills larger than $568 trends 
smoothly at age 26. 
The most expensive bills trending smoothly at age 26 is significant because expensive 
bills drive WC medical costs. Though only 25 percent of total bills, bills larger than $568 
accounted for 89 percent of total medical spending in Texas WC from 2011 to 2013. Graphs E–
H show the total cost of all bills in each quartile by age in months, and Panel B of Table 11 
shows the above-age-26 coefficients when the dependent variable is the log of the total cost of 
bills in each quartile. Total spending increases at age 26 for all but the most expensive bills. The 
25 
estimates of the percent increase in WC costs at age 26 for the bottom three quartiles of the cost 
distribution range from 9.5 to 12.6. 
The estimate of the discontinuity in spending on the most expensive bills is statistically 
insignificant, but the standard error is large at 0.144. The graph of total spending on the most 
expensive bills suggests some ages around age 26 have large spending even though the trend 
does not appear to change. Table 11 reports the equivalent estimate with the 280 bills over 
$100,000 dropped from the analysis. The estimate for total spending on the most expensive bills 
becomes an insignificant −0.005.16  The estimate of untrimmed total spending is an insignificant 
0.213. Once the outliers are removed, the estimate becomes 0.011. Overall, these results suggest 
that small medical bills respond to health insurance and that the cost to the overall WC system 
from young adults losing health insurance at age 26 is small.17 
The Effect of Health Insurance on WC Filing 
The reduced-form estimates presented in the “WC Results” section measure the percent 
change in WC claims and bills occurring at age 26.  I generate IV estimates by dividing the 
2011–2013 percent change estimates from Tables 7–11 by the estimate of the decrease in 
insurance coverage at age 26 for the Texas working subsample of −0.053 and compute standard 
errors using the delta method.  Although it is statistically insignificant, I use the Texas estimate 
because it is produced using the same population as the WC estimates.  As it is close to all of the 
other estimates of the decrease at age 26, the IV estimates are similar if I use the national 
estimates of the discontinuity at age 26. 
16 The transitory increase immediately at age 26 is from two claimants with very large medical bills, which 
illustrates the sensitivity of estimates of total spending to outliers. 
17 Theoretically, health insurance would likely matter less if an injury causes people to miss work.  
Unfortunately, the WC data do not contain information on payments for missed work.  However, larger medical bills 
being unaffected by insurance is consistent with little effect on time-loss claims since more severe medical issues 
usually have higher medical bills and more time missed from work. 
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The IV estimates are shown in Table 12. The implied IV estimate for all claims is −0.19, 
while the implied IV estimate for all bills is −1.53. These estimates imply that a 10 percentage 
point decrease in insurance coverage for young adults in Texas would increase WC claims by a 
statistically insignificant 1.9 percent and WC bills by 15.3 percent. This large IV effect on bills is 
driven by large effects of health insurance on occupational diseases bills and sprain bills. The IV 
estimates for these types of bills are −2.15 and −2.68, respectively. The implied IV estimates for 
the bottom quartile of claims is especially high. They suggest that a 10 percentage point increase 
in insurance coverage for young adults in Texas would decrease WC claims by 48.5 percent and 
WC bills by 43.4 percent. The IV estimates for bills in the lower three cost quartiles range from 
−2.34 to −1.62 and are statistically indistinguishable from one another. For bills in the top 
quartile, the IV estimate is a statistically insignificant −0.19.18 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results indicate that health insurance has a large impact on WC claims for the most 
deferrable conditions and on total WC medical bills.  It is important to note that the estimates 
presented in this paper are local in that they apply to young adults in Texas who lose health 
insurance through their parents’ employers at age 26.  Young adults differ from older adults in 
important ways.  While younger workers are healthier on average than older workers, they are 
also more likely to work in jobs with more physical demands and harsher environmental 
conditions than older workers (Fletcher, Sindelar, and Yamaguchi 2011).  Because of this, young 
18 One important caveat to these implied estimates is that the fall in employer-sponsored coverage for 
working adults is larger than the fall in coverage.  As employer-sponsored coverage is typically better than other 
health insurance sources, some of the increased care at age 26 could come from people who transition to inferior 
coverage.  If we think of employer-sponsored health insurance as the first stage, the implied IV estimates would be 
smaller. 
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adults are more prone to occupational injuries (Salminen 2004) and are thus an important group 
for WC.  During the time period studied, people under 35 accounted for over a third of all Texas 
WC claims. 
Young adults losing health insurance at age 26 in Texas likely differ from other young 
adults in a number of ways. Texas has a higher uninsured rate than other states, meaning that the 
fall in health insurance is greater in percentage terms than it would be for the rest of the nation. 
According to SIPP data, young adults with insurance through their parents’ employers at age 25 
are less likely to be married and more likely to be working part time. These factors indicate that 
taking away one source of health insurance matters more for them because they are less likely to 
have access to other high quality sources. As less-healthy young adults are more likely to sign up 
for dependent coverage, people losing coverage at age 26 are likely less healthy than other young 
adults. Since dependent coverage comes from another source besides the individual’s own 
employer, the impact of losing health insurance is likely larger for these people than it would be 
if people were losing coverage through their own employers.19  These factors suggest the impact 
of health insurance on WC may be high for this population, which is notable since I find little 
effect on overall costs. 
The main difference between Texas WC and WC in other states is that all other states 
other than Oklahoma require all employers to purchase WC insurance. Since the estimates are in 
percentage terms, requiring all employers to purchase WC insurance would generalize to other 
states if the relationship between health insurance and WC is constant across firms. Although 
Morantz (2010) finds that large firms opting out of WC in Texas offer health insurance at rates 
19 Having health insurance through a source other than one’s own employer is common. According to 2013 
March CPS data, 30 percent of workers aged 18–64 have health insurance through a source other than their own 
employers. 
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similar to other large employers, small firms opting out may be less likely to offer generous 
health insurance plans. These firms offering no or worse health insurance would mean the 
discontinuity in WC claims and bills at age 26 would be larger because young adults losing 
dependent coverage would not be able to access insurance through their own employers. 
Texas WC also differs from WC in other states in that injured workers are allowed to see 
the doctor of their choice, while 17 state WC programs restrict physician choice (Workers 
Compensation Research Institute 2014). Restrictions on physician choice make both health 
insurance and self-payment more appealing compared to WC. The increase in WC claims and 
bills may be larger at age 26 in more restrictive states since more 25-year-olds would be using 
health insurance instead of WC. On the other hand, some people will prefer to pay for their own 
medical services out of pocket or forgo care altogether when they lose health insurance rather 
than receive care through the more restrictive WC, meaning that the increase in WC claims and 
bills would be smaller at age 26. If provider preferences are the reason health insurance was 
paying for some treatment, restricting physician choice means that WC would have been paying 
for all bills prior to 26 and there would be no discontinuity at age 26. 
The results from this paper are most comparable to Heaton (2012), who studies the 
impact of the Massachusetts health insurance reform of 2006 on WC emergency room bills. The 
implied IV estimates of the effect of health insurance on WC medical bills in his study range 
from 1.17 to 2.42.20  He finds similarly large effects of health insurance on large and small bills. 
My IV estimate for the increase in WC bills of 1.53 is closer to the lower bound of his estimates. 
20 I calculate the implied IV estimates using Heaton’s (2012) estimates of the change in WC emergency 
room bills and Kolstad and Kowalski’s (2012) estimate of the increase in health insurance coverage from the 
Massachusetts reform of 5.71 percentage points.  The increase in health insurance in Massachusetts is from equal-
sized increases in employer-sponsored coverage and Medicaid.  Though most of Heaton’s estimates are for 
emergency room bills, he also considers inpatient hospital admissions and finds slightly smaller effects. 
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In contrast to Heaton, I find little impact on emergency care and that large bills do not respond to 
health insurance. These differences imply that the treatment effect for young adults losing 
coverage in Texas may differ from uninsured Massachusetts residents gaining coverage, that 
aspects of the Massachusetts health insurance reform apart from the expansion in coverage 
decreased WC bills, or that the effect of health insurance on WC was stronger at the height of the 
Great Recession. 
The estimates presented in this paper represent one of the first sets of quasi-experimental 
estimates of the effect of health insurance on WC claiming behavior. To my knowledge they are 
the first to use WC administrative data that allow for separately examining the intensive and 
extensive margins of claiming, and the first to focus on young adults specifically. As people 
under 35 comprise over half of uninsured nonelderly adults, knowing the effect of health 
insurance on WC filing for young adults is important in understanding the potential impact of the 
ACA on WC. The results presented in this paper suggest that the expansion of insurance from 
the ACA will shift a large amount of discretionary medical care from being paid for by WC to 
being paid for by health insurance. Despite the large effects of health insurance on claiming 
behavior, the cost savings to WC systems will likely be small since cheaper services are most 
responsive to health insurance. 
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Table 1  Means of Key Variables from the NHIS 
 Aged 24–25 Aged 26–27 
Male 0.47 0.47 
Completed high school 0.87 0.87 
Completed college 0.26 0.29 
Black 0.16 0.15 
White 0.74 0.74 
Hispanic 0.26 0.26 
Married 0.27 0.38 
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.57 0.53 
Privately purchased insurance 0.03 0.04 
Uninsured 0.31 0.34 
Working 0.71 0.74 
Hours worked per week 26.71 28.57 
Works less than 35 hours per week 0.18 0.17 
Works less than 30 hours per week 0.12 0.11 
Self-employed 0.01 0.02 
N 5,055 5,322 
NOTE:  The sample includes all individuals aged 24–27 in the 2011 and 2012 NHIS. 
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Table 2  Regression Discontinuity Models of Health Insurance and Employment by Age from the NHIS 
Dependent variable 
Mean at 
age 25 
Discontinuity at age 
26 n 
Panel A: Full sample    
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.58 −0.086*** 
(0.024) 
8,356 
Privately purchased insurance 0.03 0.010 
(0.010) 
10,013 
Uninsured 0.30 0.042* 
(0.023) 
10,199 
Working 0.71 −0.011 
(0.017) 
10,249 
Hours worked per week 27.99 −0.636 
(1.312) 
10,290 
Log of hours worked per week 3.59 −0.006 
(0.044) 
7,291 
Works less than 35 hours per week 0.17 0.002 
(0.017) 
10,168 
Works less than 30 hours per week 0.11 0.004 
(0.019) 
10,168 
Self-employed 0.01 0.008 
(0.008) 
10,274 
Panel B: Conditional on working    
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.65 −0.076*** 
(0.028) 
6,460 
Privately purchased insurance 0.03 0.008 
(0.012) 
7,239 
Uninsured 0.27 0.044* 
(0.026) 
7,383 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.  The sample includes all 
individuals aged 24–27 in the 2011 and 2012 NHIS. The discontinuities at age 26 are the above-age-26 coefficients from separate 
regressions of Equation (1) that control for indicators for race, sex, year, and marital status, education, and a quadratic 
polynomial in age in months fully interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 26. Standard errors are clustered by 
age in months and are shown in parentheses. The estimates in Panel A are for the full sample, while the estimates in Panel B are 
restricted to the sample of working individuals. 
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Table 3  Means of Key Variables from the SIPP 
 Texas  Rest of U.S. 
 Aged 23–25 Aged 26–28  Aged 23–25 Aged 26–28 
Male 0.51 0.48  0.50 0.49 
Completed high school 0.92 0.91  0.93 0.92 
Completed college 0.19 0.26  0.25 0.32 
Black 0.17 0.13  0.13 0.11 
White 0.76 0.81  0.77 0.78 
Hispanic 0.39 0.36  0.14 0.14 
Married 0.24 0.38  0.19 0.38 
Employer-sponsored insurance as a dependent 0.22 0.09  0.27 0.12 
Insurance through own employer 0.24 0.36  0.26 0.39 
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.46 0.45  0.52 0.50 
Uninsured 0.49 0.50  0.40 0.43 
Working 0.72 0.81  0.72 0.77 
Hours worked per week 25.69 31.84  25.81 29.42 
Works less than 35 hours per week 0.23 0.14  0.23 0.15 
Works less than 30 hours per week 0.16 0.10  0.16 0.11 
Self-employed 0.03 0.06  0.03 0.05 
N 1,727 1,618  18,731 18,578 
NOTE: The sample includes all individuals aged 23–28 in the January 2011 to August 2013 SIPP. 
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Table 4  Fixed Effects Models of Health Insurance and Employment from the SIPP 
Dependent variable 
Texas  Rest of U.S. 
Mean at 
age 25 
Effect of 
turning 26 N  
Mean at 
age 25 
Effect of 
turning 26 N 
Panel A: Full sample        
Employer-sponsored insurance as a dependent 0.16 −0.082** 
(0.036) 
3,345  0.20 −0.046*** 
(0.010) 
37,309 
Employer-sponsored insurance through own employer 0.27 0.007 
(0.038) 
3,345  0.33 0.005 
(0.011) 
37,309 
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.44 −0.075* 
(0.042) 
3,345  0.53 −0.043*** 
(0.011) 
40,654 
Uninsured 0.52 0.031 
(0.040) 
3,345  0.32 0.050*** 
(0.010) 
40,654 
Working 0.76 −0.011 
(0.033) 
3,345  0.75 −0.012 
(0.010) 
37,309 
Hours worked per week 28.11 0.238 
(1.407) 
3,344  28.20 −1.027** 
(0.406) 
37,297 
Log of hours worked per week 3.54 −0.008 
(0.040) 
2,555  3.55 −0.037*** 
(0.013) 
27,732 
Works less than 35 hours per week 0.20 −0.030 
(0.032) 
3,344  0.19 0.017* 
(0.010) 
37,297 
Works less than 30 hours per week 0.14 −0.024 
(0.029) 
3,344  0.12 0.018** 
(0.009) 
37,297 
Self-employed 0.04 −0.013 
(0.016) 
3,345  0.03 −0.002 
(0.004) 
37,309 
Panel B: Conditional on working        
Employer-sponsored insurance as a dependent 0.14 −0.078** 
(0.039) 
2,556  0.20 −0.043*** 
(0.012) 
27,745 
Employer-sponsored insurance through own employer 0.36 −0.003 
(0.048) 
2,556  0.43 0.011 
(0.013) 
27,745 
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.49 −0.084* 
(0.048) 
2,556  0.62 −0.036*** 
(0.012) 
30,301 
Uninsured 0.47 0.053 
(0.044) 
2,556  0.32 0.045*** 
(0.012) 
30,301 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level.  The sample includes all individuals aged 23–28 in the January 2011 to August 
2013 SIPP. The effects of turning 26 are the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (2) that control for indicators for the year and month of the 
observation and for marital status, a linear control in age, and an individual fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by individual and are shown in parentheses. The estimates in 
Panel A are for the full sample, while the estimates in Panel B are restricted to the sample of working individuals. 
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Table 5  Top Claims in Each Quartile of Weekend Likelihood Distribution 
 Percent of 
all claims 
Percent first receiving 
care on weekends 
Top quartile (weekend likelihood ≥ 0.096) 
Open wound of finger 
Unspecified injury 
Open wound of hand 
Open wound of head 
Open wound of elbow, forearm, and wrist 
0.055 
0.047 
0.019 
0.016 
0.011 
0.108 
0.128 
0.108 
0.097 
0.096 
51st to 75th percentile (0.069 ≤ weekend likelihood < 0.096 
Contusion of lower limb 
Contusion of upper limb 
Sprains and strains of ankle and foot 
Contusion of trunk 
Contusion of face, scalp, and neck 
0.052 
0.042 
0.037 
0.018 
0.016 
0.072 
0.080 
0.071 
0.069 
0.089 
26th to 50th percentile (0.050 ≤ weekend likelihood < 0.069 
Sprains and strains of back 
Unspecified disorder of joint 
Sprains and strains of knee and leg 
Unspecified disorder of back 
Sprains and strains of wrist and hand 
0.113 
0.041 
0.037 
0.031 
0.029 
0.050 
0.056 
0.057 
0.059 
0.065 
Bottom quartile (weekend likelihood < 0.050) 
Sprains and strains of shoulder and upper arm 
Disorders of bone attachments 
Disorders of tendons, bursa, and synovium 
Neck disorders 
Intervertebral disc disorder 
0.041 
0.012 
0.012 
0.006 
0.005 
0.049 
0.021 
0.020 
0.046 
0.022 
NOTE:  The weekend likelihood is constructed using all WC claims from Texas with a nonmissing date of first treatment.  
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Table 6  Texas WC Claims and Medical Bills Descriptive Statistics 
 Claims 
Aged 24 and 25 Aged 26 and 27 
Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. Median 
Age 24.98 0.58 25.00 26.96 0.58 26.92 
Male 0.67 0.47 1.0 0.66 0.47 1.00 
Injury occurs on weekend (%) 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.07 
Total charge ($) 6,557 66,910 981 6,639 38,945 1,036 
Total medical bills 6.30 11.91 3.00 6.78 12.40 3.00 
N 29,477 30,922 
 Medical bills 
Aged 24 and 25 Aged 26 and 27 
Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. Median 
Age 24.98 0.57 25.00 26.96 0.58 27.00 
Male 0.76 0.43 1.00 0.76 0.43 1.00 
Injury occurs on weekend (%) 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.07 
Charge ($) 1,450 10,769 249 1,379 9,799 247 
N 104,117 117,455 
NOTE: The data include all WC claims and bills in Texas from 2011 to 2013. 
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Table 7  Regression Discontinuity Models for All Claims and Medical Bills and for Different Injury Types in 
Texas, by Age 
 2011–2013 2005–2007 Difference 
2011–2013 
w/employment 
control 
Panel A:  RD models for log (number of initiated WC claims) in Texas by age at start of claim 
All claims 0.010 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.027) 
by Type     
Sprain/strain claims 0.060 
(0.045) 
0.073 
(0.047) 
−0.013 
(0.065) 
0.038 
(0.048) 
Nonsprain/strain claims −0.013 
(0.034) 
−0.019 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.045) 
−0.004 
(0.037) 
Occupational disease claims 0.010 
(0.052) 
−0.036 
(0.030) 
0.046 
(0.060) 
−0.015 
(0.069) 
Panel B:  RD models for log (number of WC medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
All bills 0.081*** 
(0.026) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
0.062** 
(0.031) 
0.092*** 
(0.034) 
by Type     
Sprain/strain bills 0.114*** 
(0.040) 
0.030 
(0.029) 
0.084* 
(0.050) 
0.151*** 
(0.050) 
Nonsprain/strain bills 0.048 
(0.045) 
0.041 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.053) 
0.046 
(0.045) 
Occupational disease bills 0.142*** 
(0.037) 
−0.046 
(0.042) 
0.188*** 
(0.056) 
0.160*** 
(0.061) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.  The first column displays 
the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011-2013 data. The second column displays the 
above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2005-2007 data. The third column is the difference 
between the 2011-2013 estimates and the 2005-2007 estimates. The fourth column displays the above-age-26 coefficients from 
separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011-2013 data that control for the number of people working at each age in each year 
in Texas from the 2011 to 2013 ACS. The models in columns 1, 2, and 4 include a quadratic polynomial in age in months fully 
interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 26. In columns 1 and 2, there is a separate observation for each age in 
months. In column 4, there is a separate observation for each age in months for each year of the data, and the models include a 
vector of year indicator variables. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the 
log of the number of claims. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the log of the number of bills. There are 60,399 WC claims 
for young adults aged 23–27 from 2011 to 2013 and 84,491 from 2005 to 2007. There are 221,572 WC bills for young adults 
aged 23–27 from 2011 to 2013 and 351,439 from 2005 to 2007. 
SOURCE:  The Texas WC medical database. 
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Table 8  Regression Discontinuity Models for Claims and Medical Bills by Weekend Likelihood in Texas, by 
Age 
 2011–2013 2005–2007 Difference 
2011–2013 
w/employment 
control 
Panel A:  RD models for log (number of initiated WC claims) in Texas by age at start of claim 
Bottom quartile 0.257** 
(0.098) 
−0.030 
(0.042) 
0.287*** 
(0.106) 
0.235** 
(0.101) 
26th to 50th percentile −0.038 
(0.033) 
0.047 
(0.041) 
−0.085 
(0.053) 
−0.047 
(0.041) 
51st to 75th percentile −0.008 
(0.032) 
0.000 
(0.048) 
−0.009 
(0.058) 
−0.005 
(0.042) 
Top quartile −0.001 
(0.043) 
−0.038 
(0.035) 
0.037 
(0.056) 
−0.007 
(0.042) 
Panel B:  RD models for log (number of WC medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
Bottom quartile 0.230*** 
(0.069) 
0.038 
(0.045) 
0.191** 
(0.082) 
0.244** 
(0.121) 
26th to 50th percentile 0.142*** 
(0.052) 
0.004 
(0.025) 
0.138** 
(0.057) 
0.127** 
(0.060) 
51st to 75th percentile 0.005 
(0.053) 
−0.003 
(0.034) 
0.008 
(0.063) 
0.015 
(0.056) 
Top quartile 0.038 
(0.051) 
0.052 
(0.041) 
−0.014 
(0.065) 
0.071 
(0.062) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Claims are classified into 
quartiles by the likelihood that the ICD-9 code was first reported on the weekend as described in the text. The first column 
displays the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011–2013 data. The second column 
displays the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2005–2007 data. The third column is the 
difference between the 2011–2013 estimates and the 2005–2007 estimates. The fourth column displays the above-age-26 
coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011–2013 data that control for the number of people working at 
each age in each year in Texas from the 2011 to 2013 ACS. The models in columns 1, 2, and 4 include a quadratic polynomial in 
age in months fully interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 26. In columns 1 and 2, there is a separate 
observation for each age in months. In column 4, there is a separate observation for each age in months for each year of the data, 
and the models include a vector of year indicator variables. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. In Panel A, the 
dependent variables are the log of the number of claims. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the log of the number of bills. 
There are 60,399 WC claims for young adults aged 23–27 from 2011 to 2013 and 84,491 from 2005 to 2007. There are 221,572 
WC bills for young adults aged 23–27 from 2011 to 2013 and 351,439 from 2005 to 2007. 
SOURCE:  The Texas WC medical database. 
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Table 9  Regression Discontinuity Models for Claims and Medical Bills by Narrow Injury Categories in 
Texas, by Age 
 Discontinuity at age 26 N 
Panel A:  RD models for log (number of initiated WC claims) in Texas by age at start of claim 
Back claims −0.066 
(0.089) 
6,683 
Contusion claims 0.037 
(0.065) 
7,268 
Laceration claims −0.042 
(0.040) 
10,159 
Fracture claims −0.013 
(0.129) 
2,749 
Burn claims −0.042 
(0.144) 
1,212 
Dislocation claims 0.221 
(0.411) 
406 
Panel B:  RD models for log (number of initiated WC medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
Back bills 0.252*** 
(0.077) 
28,247 
Contusion bills 0.073 
(0.051) 
15,076 
Laceration bills −0.093* 
(0.053) 
21,977 
Fracture bills 0.037 
(0.114) 
22,486 
Burn bills 0.223 
(0.189) 
4,243 
Dislocation bills 0.319*** 
(0.106) 
5,127 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The estimates are the 
above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011–2013 data. The models include a quadratic 
polynomial in age in months fully interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 26. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the log of the number of claims. In Panel B, the dependent 
variables are the log of the number of bills. The numbers of each type of claims and bills in the sample are shown in column 3. 
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Table 10  Regression Discontinuity Models for Intensity and Type of Treatment in Texas, by Age 
Mean bills per claim −0.228 
(0.229) 
Mean of log (number of bills per claim) −0.035* 
(0.020) 
Office visit bills 0.081*** 
(0.027) 
Physical therapy and chiropractic bills 0.180** 
(0.075) 
Other bills 0.039 
(0.038) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.  The estimates are the 
above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011–2013 data. The models include a quadratic 
polynomial in age in months fully interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 26. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. For the first estimate, the dependent variable is the mean number of bills per claim at each age. For the 
second estimate, the dependent variable is the mean of the log of the number of bills per claim at each age. For the third, fourth, 
and fifth estimates, the dependent variables are logs of counts of bills at each age. 
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Table 11  Regression Discontinuity Models for Cost of WC Medical Services in Texas, by Age 
Panel A:  RD models for log (number of WC medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
Bottom quartile 0.086* 
(0.045) 
26th to 50th percentile 0.124*** 
(0.045) 
51st to 75th percentile 0.101*** 
(0.033) 
Top quartile 0.010 
(0.041) 
Panel B:  RD models for log (total costs of WC medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
Bottom quartile 0.095* 
(0.049) 
26th to 50th percentile 0.126*** 
(0.046) 
51st to 75th percentile 0.093** 
(0.036) 
Top quartile 0.227 
(0.144) 
Top quartile-trimmed −0.005 
(0.076) 
All bills 0.213 
(0.128) 
All bills-trimmed 0.011 
(0.066) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The cost of bills is 
calculated in 2013 dollars. Bills are classified into quartiles by cost as described in the text. The estimates are the above-age-26 
coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011–2013 data that include a quadratic polynomial in age in months 
fully interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 26. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. In Panel A, 
the dependent variables are the log of the number of bills. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the log of total costs. For the 
trimmed bills, the 280 bills greater than $100,000 are removed from the sample. There are 221,572 WC bills for young adults 
aged 23–27 from 2011 to 2013. 
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Table 12  The Impact of Insurance on WC Claims, Bills, and Costs 
Panel A:  Claims Panel B:  Bills Panel C:  Costs by cost quartile 
All claims −0.19 
(0.30) 
All bills −1.53*** 
(0.49) 
Bottom quartile −1.62* 
(0.85) 
by Type  by Type  26th to 50th percentile −2.34*** 
(0.85) 
Sprain/strain claims −1.13 
(0.85) 
Sprain/strain bills −2.15*** 
(0.75) 
51st to 75th percentile −1.91*** 
(0.62) 
Nonsprain/strain claims 0.25 
(0.64) 
Nonsprain/strain bills −0.91 
(0.85) 
Top quartile −0.19 
(0.77) 
Occupational disease claims −0.19 
(0.98) 
Occupational disease claims −2.68*** 
(0.70) 
  
by Weekend likelihood  by Weekend likelihood  Total costs by cost quartile 
Bottom quartile −4.85*** 
(1.85) 
Bottom quartile −4.34*** 
(1.30) 
Bottom quartile −1.79* 
(0.92) 
26th to 50th percentile 0.72 
(0.62) 
26th to 50th percentile −2.68*** 
(0.98) 
26th to 50th percentile −2.38*** 
(0.87) 
51st to 75th percentile 0.15 
(0.6) 
51st to 75th percentile −0.09 
(1.00) 
51st to 75th percentile −1.75** 
(0.68) 
Top quartile 0.02 
(0.81) 
Top quartile −0.72 
(0.96) 
Top quartile-trimmed 0.09 
(1.43) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.  Each coefficient is the ratio of the reduced-form coefficient from Tables 7–
11 divided by the estimate of the change in insurance coverage at age 26 for working Texans of −0.053. Standard errors are computed using the delta method and are shown in 
parentheses. 
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure 1  Means of Insurance and Employment Variables by Age from 2011 and 2012 NHIS 
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NOTE: The points represent means of NHIS variables at each age in months. 
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure 2  Counts of WC Claims and Medical Bills in Texas by Age from 2011 to 2013 
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NOTE: The points represent counts of WC claims or medical bills at each age in months.  
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure 3  Counts of WC Claims and Medical Bills in Texas by Age from 2011 to 2013 by Weekend Likelihood 
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NOTE: Claims are classified into quartiles by the likelihood that the ICD-9 code was first reported on the weekend as described in 
the text. The points represent counts of WC claims or medical bills in each quartile of the weekend likelihood distribution at each 
age in months.  
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure 4  Intensity and Type of WC Treatment in Texas by Age from 2011 to 2013 
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NOTE: In graph A, each point represents the mean number of bills per claim by age in months at the start of the claim. In graph B, 
each point represents the mean of the log of the number of bills per claim by age in months at the start of the claim. In graphs C-E, 
each point represents counts of bills by the type of treatment paid for by age in months at the time of treatment.  
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure 5  WC Bill Cost in Texas by Age from 2011 to 2013 
 
 
 
1000 
A. Bills in Bottom Quartile of Cost Dist.  
1600 
B. Bills in 26th to 50th Percentile of Cost Dist.  
1600 
C. Bills in 51st to 75th Percentile of Cost Dist. 
 
900 
 
 
800 
 
1400 
 
1400 
 
 
700 
1200 1200 
 
600  
24 25 26 27 28 
1000  
24 25 26 27 28 
1000  
24 25 26 27 28 
 
 
1400 
 
1300 
 
1200 
D. Bills in Top Quartile of Cost Dist.  
80000 
 
 
70000 
E. Total Cost of Bills in Bottom Quartile of Cost Dist. F. Total Cost of Bills in 26th to 50th Percentile of Cost Dist. 
300000 
 
 
 
250000 
60000 
1100 
 
1000 
 
 
50000 
 
200000 
 
900  
24 25 26 27 28 
40000  
24 25 26 27 28 
150000  
24 25 26 27 28 
 
G. Total Cost of Bills in 51st to 75th Percentile of Cost Dist. 
600000 
 
 
500000 
 
 
 
400000 
 
 
8000000 
 
7000000 
 
6000000 
 
5000000 
H. Total Cost of Bills in Top Quartile of Cost Dist. I. Total Cost of Trimmed Bills in Top Quartile of Cost Dist. 
6000000 
 
 
 
5000000 
 
 
4000000 
 
4000000 
 
300000  
24 25 26 27 28 
3000000  
24 25 26 27 28 
3000000  
24 25 26 27 28 
 
 
1.00e+07 
 
 
8000000 
J. Total Cost of All Bills  
7000000 
 
 
6000000 
K. Total Cost of Trimmed Bills 
 
5000000 
 
6000000  
4000000 
 
4000000  
24 25 26 27 28 
3000000  
24 25 26 27 28 
 
 
NOTE:  Bills are classified into quartiles by cost as described in the text. The points in graphs A-D represent counts of WC medical bills 
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SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Appendix A 
 
Robustness to Specification—SIPP 
 
 
In the second section of the paper, I include a linear control for age with the SIPP analysis. 
Table A.1 considers the sensitivity of the estimates in Table 4 to not controlling for age and to 
controlling for a quadratic polynomial in age. 
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Table A.1  Sensitivity of Fixed Effects Models of Health Insurance and Employment from the SIPP 
 
Dependent variable 
Mean at 
age 25 
No age 
control 
Quadratic age 
control N 
Mean at 
age 25 
No age 
control 
Quadratic age 
control N 
Panel A: Full sample         
Employer-sponsored insurance as a dependent 0.16 −0.074** 
(0.034) 
−0.082** 
(0.036) 
3,345 0.20 −0.048*** 
(0.009) 
−0.045*** 
(0.010) 
37,309 
Employer-sponsored insurance through own employer 0.27 0.010 
(0.035) 
0.007 
(0.038) 
3,345 0.33 0.008 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
37,309 
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.44 −0.065* 
(0.039) 
−0.075* 
(0.042) 
3,345 0.53 −0.039*** 
(0.010) 
−0.039*** 
(0.011) 
40,654 
Uninsured 0.52 0.033 
(0.036) 
0.031 
(0.040) 
3,345 0.32 0.051*** 
(0.010) 
0.051*** 
(0.010) 
40,654 
Working 0.76 0.000 
(0.031) 
−0.010 
(0.033) 
3,345 0.75 −0.001 
(0.009) 
−0.012 
(0.010) 
37,309 
Hours worked per week 28.11 0.743 
(1.340) 
0.261 
(1.405) 
3,344 28.20 −0.339 
(0.369) 
−1.033** 
(0.406) 
37,297 
Log of hours worked per week 3.54 0.005 
(0.038) 
−0.010 
(0.040) 
2,555 3.55 −0.021* 
(0.012) 
−0.039*** 
(0.013) 
27,732 
Works less than 35 hours per week 0.20 −0.026 
(0.029) 
−0.030 
(0.032) 
3,344 0.19 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.017* 
(0.010) 
37,297 
Works less than 30 hours per week 0.14 −0.016 
(0.027) 
−0.025 
(0.029) 
3,344 0.12 0.012 
(0.008) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
37,297 
Self-employed 0.04 −0.006 
(0.011) 
−0.013 
(0.016) 
3,345 0.03 −0.000 
(0.004) 
−0.002 
(0.004) 
37,309 
Panel B: Conditional on working         
Employer-sponsored insurance as a dependent 0.14 −0.072* 
(0.037) 
−0.078** 
(0.039) 
2,556 0.20 −0.045*** 
(0.011) 
−0.043*** 
(0.012) 
27,745 
Employer-sponsored insurance through own employer 0.36 0.006 
(0.043) 
−0.003 
(0.048) 
2,556 0.43 0.014 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
27,745 
Employer-sponsored insurance 0.49 −0.068 
(0.043) 
−0.084* 
(0.048) 
2,556 0.62 −0.029** 
(0.011) 
−0.030** 
(0.013) 
30,301 
Uninsured 0.47 0.051 
(0.039) 
0.053 
(0.044) 
2,556 0.32 0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.012) 
30,301 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The sample includes all individuals aged 23–28 in the January 2011 to 
August 2013 SIPP. The effects of turning 26 are the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (2) that control for indicators for the year and month of the 
observation and for marital status and an individual fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by individual and are shown in parentheses. The estimates in Panel A are for the full 
sample, while the estimates in Panel B are restricted to the sample of working individuals. 
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Appendix B 
 
Robustness to Specification–WC 
 
 
The main analysis estimated discontinuities at age 26 parametrically with two years 
of data on either side of the cutoff. I now consider the robustness of these results to 
different bandwidths. I also use a triangular kernel to fit local linear regressions on each 
side of age 26 and estimate the limit of the expectation function from the left and the right 
of age 26 to obtain nonparametric estimates of the discontinuity, as in Hahn, Todd, and 
Van der Klaauw (2001). 
Panel A of Table B.1 considers the robustness of the claims results for all injuries 
and for different types of injuries. The first column is the original estimate. The second 
column uses 18 months of data on either side of the threshold. The third column uses three 
years of data on either side of the threshold. Columns 4–6 display nonparametric estimates 
of the discontinuity in claims at age 26 for each bandwidth. Panel B of Table B.1 displays 
the corresponding estimates for bills. Table B.2 displays the equivalent results with ICD-9 
codes classified by the likelihood they are first reported on weekends. 
The results are qualitatively very similar across specifications. When the estimate is 
statistically significant in the original specification, the estimates are statistically 
significant in all other specifications as well. In a few cases, estimates that are not 
statistically significant become statistically significant in the new specifications. They are 
usually significant at the 10 percent level and are only significant in one of the six 
specifications. The only exceptions are the estimates for bills in the third quartile of the 
weekend distribution, which are significant in half of the specifications.  
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Table B.1  Sensitivity of Regression Discontinuity Models for All Claims and Medical Bills and for 
Different Injury Types in Texas, by Age 
 Parametric specification Local linear models 
24–27 24.5–26.5 23–28 24–27 24.5–26.5 23–28 
Panel A:  RD models for log (number of initiated WC claims) in Texas by age at start of claim 
All claims 0.010 
(0.016) 
−0.019 
(0.017) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
by Type       
Sprain/strain claims 0.060 
(0.045) 
−0.008 
(0.049) 
0.065* 
(0.036) 
0.042 
(0.031) 
0.036 
(0.034) 
0.030 
(0.025) 
Nonsprain/strain 
claims 
−0.013 
(0.034) 
−0.043 
(0.035) 
0.028 
(0.057) 
−0.024 
(0.022) 
−0.024 
(0.025) 
−0.019 
(0.017) 
Occupational 
disease claims 
0.010 
(0.052) 
−0.026 
(0.027) 
0.086* 
(0.044) 
0.030 
(0.040) 
0.029 
(0.045) 
0.032 
(0.033) 
Panel B:  RD models for log (number of WC medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
All bills 0.081*** 
(0.026) 
0.064** 
(0.027) 
0.071*** 
(0.020) 
0.066*** 
(0.020) 
0.072*** 
(0.024) 
0.052*** 
(0.016) 
by Type       
Sprain/strain bills 0.114*** 
(0.040) 
0.118*** 
(0.041) 
0.110*** 
(0.037) 
0.091*** 
(0.029) 
0.095*** 
(0.029) 
0.052* 
(0.027) 
Nonsprain/strain 
bills 
0.048 
(0.045) 
−0.000 
(0.042) 
0.023 
(0.032) 
0.032 
(0.031) 
0.036 
(0.038) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
Occupational 
disease bills 
0.142*** 
(0.037) 
0.180*** 
(0.039) 
0.169*** 
(0.035) 
0.141*** 
(0.029) 
0.150*** 
(0.032) 
0.133*** 
(0.024) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.  Columns 1–
3 display the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011–2013 data that 
include a quadratic polynomial in age in months fully interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 
26. Columns 4–6 display nonparametric estimates of the discontinuities at age 26. Columns 1 and 4 use two years 
of data on either side of the threshold. Columns 2 and 5 use 18 months of data on either side of the threshold. 
Columns 3 and 6 use three years of data on either side of the threshold. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the log of the number of claims. In Panel B, the dependent 
variables are the log of the number of bills. There are 60,399 WC claims for young adults aged 23–27, 45,563 for 
young adults aged 24.5–26.5, and 90,256 for young adults aged 23–28. There are 221,572 WC bills for young 
adults aged 23–27, 167,040 for young adults aged 24.5–26.5, and 333,811 for young adults aged 23–28. 
SOURCE: The 2011–2013 Texas WC medical database. 
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Table B.2  Sensitivity of Regression Discontinuity Models for Claims and Medical Bills by Weekend 
Likelihood in Texas, by Age 
 Parametric specification Local linear models 
24–27 24.5–26.5 23–28 24–27 24.5–26.5 23–28 
Panel A:  RD models for log (number of initiated WC claims) in Texas by age at start of claim 
Bottom quartile 0.257** 
(0.098) 
0.248** 
(0.119) 
0.228*** 
(0.076) 
0.198*** 
(0.070) 
0.225*** 
(0.084) 
0.139** 
(0.057) 
26th to 50th 
percentile 
−0.038 
(0.033) 
−0.071* 
(0.040) 
0.027 
(0.031) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
−0.026 
(0.026) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
51st to 75th 
percentile 
−0.008 
(0.032) 
−0.024 
(0.036) 
−0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.007 
(0.025) 
−0.006 
(0.027) 
−0.007 
(0.022) 
Top quartile −0.001 
(0.043) 
−0.047 
(0.041) 
−0.032 
(0.035) 
-0.027 
(0.026) 
−0.030 
(0.029) 
−0.030 
(0.021) 
Panel B:  RD models for log (number of WC medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
Bottom quartile 0.230*** 
(0.069) 
0.263*** 
(0.080) 
0.235*** 
(0.065) 
0.208*** 
(0.048) 
0.224*** 
(0.055) 
0.117*** 
(0.042) 
26th to 50th 
percentile 
0.142*** 
(0.052) 
0.053* 
(0.031) 
0.078** 
(0.036) 
0.075** 
(0.033) 
0.084** 
(0.037) 
0.049* 
(0.028) 
51st to 75th 
percentile 
0.005 
(0.053) 
0.017 
(0.054) 
0.101* 
(0.051) 
0.073* 
(0.043) 
0.053 
(0.052) 
0.103*** 
(0.033) 
Top quartile 0.038 
(0.051) 
0.045 
(0.062) 
−0.016 
(0.041) 
0.005 
(0.039) 
0.023 
(0.047) 
−0.010 
(0.031) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.  Claims are 
classified into quartiles by the likelihood that the ICD-9 code was first reported on the weekend as described in the 
text. Columns 1 through 3 display the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 
2011–2013 data that include a quadratic polynomial in age in months fully interacted with an indicator for age 
greater than or equal to 26. Columns 4–6 display nonparametric estimates of the discontinuities at age 26. Columns 
1 and 4 use two years of data on either side of the threshold. Columns 2 and 5 use 18 months of data on either side 
of the threshold. Columns 3 and 6 use three years of data on either side of the threshold. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the log of the number of claims. In Panel B, the 
dependent variables are the log of the number of bills. There are 60,399 WC claims for young adults aged 23–27, 
45,563 for young adults aged 24.5–26.5, and 90,256 for young adults aged 23–28. There are 221,572 WC bills for 
young adults aged 23–27, 167,040 for young adults aged 24.5–26.5, and 333,811 for young adults aged 23–28. 
SOURCE: The 2011–2013 Texas WC medical database. 
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Appendix C 
 
Placebo Analysis at Other Ages 
 
 
Tables 7 and 8 displayed the above-age-26 coefficients from Equation (3) using 2005–2007 
data. None of the placebo coefficients were statistically different from zero. As another placebo 
test, I now show estimates of discontinuities at age 30. Figures C.1 and C.2 show the age profiles 
around 30. The results for bills and claims are shown in Table C.1. One of the coefficients is 
significant at the 10 percent level, while another is significant at the 5 percent level. This amounts 
to 12.5 percent of the estimates for discontinuities at 30 being significant at the 10 percent level or 
higher, which is not far from the 10 percent we would expect. 
As these placebo tests are arbitrary, I also repeat the analysis at 10 consecutive ages starting 
with age 28 using 2011–2013 data. The coefficients are significant in 20.6 percent of these placebo 
regressions, which suggests that the RD strategy overrejects the null hypothesis of no effect. I put 
the placebo estimates through the same sensitivity tests that the main estimates were all robust to. 
Only 5.6 percent of the placebo estimates are robust to these minor alterations of the empirical 
strategy. The placebo estimates being much more sensitive to the specification than the original 
estimates suggests that it is unlikely that the results presented in the paper and in Appendix B are 
driven by chance. 
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Table C.1  Placebo Analysis at Age 30 for Regression Discontinuity Models Claims and Medical Bills in Texas, 
by Age 
Panel A:  RD models for log (number of initiated 
WC claims) in Texas by age at start of 
claim 
Panel C:  RD models for log (number of initiated WC 
claims by weekend likelihood) in Texas by age at 
start of claim 
All claims 0.008 
(0.026) 
Bottom quartile 0.185** 
(0.078) 
by Type    
Sprain/strain claims 0.050 
(0.047) 
26th to 50th percentile 0.025 
(0.036) 
Nonsprain/strain claims −0.041 
(0.030) 
51st to 75th percentile 0.051 
(0.042) 
Occupational disease claims 0.079 
(0.054) 
Top quartile −0.009 
(0.051) 
Panel B: RD models for log (number of WC 
medical bills) in Texas by age at treatment 
Panel D:  RD models for log (number of WC medical bills 
by weekend likelihood) in Texas by age at 
treatment 
All Bills 0.040 
(0.030) 
Bottom quartile 0.070 
(0.048) 
by Type    
Sprain/strain bills 0.074* 
(0.039) 
26th to 50th percentile 0.065 
(0.041) 
Nonsprain/strain bills 0.022 
(0.035) 
51st to 75th percentile −0.043 
(0.036) 
Occupational disease bills 0.041 
(0.045) 
Top quartile −0.031 
(0.043) 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. For Panels C and D, claims 
are classified into quartiles by the likelihood that the ICD-9 code was first reported on the weekend as described in the text. The 
estimates are the above-age-26 coefficients from separate regressions of Equation (3) using 2011–2013 data that includes a 
quadratic polynomial in age in months fully interacted with an indicator for age greater than or equal to 26. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. In panels A and C, the dependent variables are the log of the number of claims. In Panel B and D, the 
dependent variables are the log of the number of bills. There are 79,650 WC claims and 324,408 WC bills for people aged 28–31 
from 2011 to 2013. 
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure C.1  Counts of WC Claims and Medical Bills in Texas by Age from 2011 to 2013 
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NOTE: The points represent counts of WC claims or medical bills at each age in months.  
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure C.2  Counts of WC Claims and Medical Bills in Texas by Age from 2011 to 2013 by Weekend Likelihood 
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SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Appendix D 
 
Age Profiles for 2005 to 2007 
 
 
Figure D.1  Counts of WC Claims and Medical Bills in Texas by Age from 2005 to 2007 
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NOTE: The points represent counts of WC claims or medical bills at each age in months.  
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Figure D.2  Counts of WC Claims and Medical Bills in Texas by Age from 2005 to 2007 by Weekend Likelihood 
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NOTE: Claims are classified into quartiles by the likelihood that the ICD-9 code was first reported on the weekend as described in 
the text. The points represent counts of WC claims or medical bills in each quartile of the weekend likelihood distribution at each 
age in months.  
SOURCE: The Texas WC medical database. 
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Appendix E 
 
Texas Employment by Age and Year from 2011 to 2013 ACS 
 
 
Figure E.1  Texas Employment by Age and Year from 2011 to 2013 ACS 
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